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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ROCKY ~IOUNTAIN HONEY COMPANY, Inc.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
~!ARION

Case No. 7243

R. CRYSTAL and DELSA

N. CRYSTAL, his· wife,

Defendants and Respondents.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This action was brought by the plaintiff and appellant in the Third Judicial District Court at Salt Lake
City, Utah, and involves a house and lot located at
645 North Second West in Salt Lake City. Although
the complaint has six causes of action, the principal
prayer is twofold: one, claim for the entire piece of
property 3¥2 rods x 10 rods, alleged to have been acquired hy reason of a tax sale to Salt Lake City Corporation and a deed from Salt Lake City Corporation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the appellant; and two, appellant prays that it be
given an easement along the south boundary of the
property in question. There were also claims for damages to personal property, actual and punitive, and a
restraining order was sought. At the conclusion of appellant's case, respondents moved to dismiss all causes
of action on the ground~ among others that there was
a total lack of proof. This motion was granted as to the
first cause of action, which sought title by virtue of an
alleged special tax deed from Salt Lake City Corporation. Thereafter, respondents ,presented their case as
to the remaining causes of action, and at the conclusion
thereof, the court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and entered a judgment in favor of respondents accordingly on all remaining causes of action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All italics, unless otherwise n.oted, are respondents')
The statement of facts set forth in appellants' brief,
if in reality there is any such statement, is so brief it is
deemed advisable to amplify same.
The property involved in this action, including the
alleged easement across it, lies wholly within Lot 8 of
block 138, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey. Block 138
contains 8 lots and lies between 5th and 6th North and
2nd and 3rd West Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Pugsley Street intersects this block through the middle
in a north-south direction, and lots 2 and 7 abut this
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avenue on the East, lots 3 and 6 on the \Yest. Lot 8 lies
to the east of lot 7, and abuts along 2nd West Street .
. .-\.ppellant
.
's exhibit T not scaled, is a very rough
drR\Ying of the property herein directly involved, as
\Yell as of adjacent property to the south and west.
Appellant's exhibit S and repondents' exhibit 2 are
abstracts of title covering these properties which contain a more accurate plat, so far as legal descriptions
are concerned, at the back of each abstract.
The house and lot of respondents, at 645 North
Second ·west Street, faces easterly on the west side of
2nd West with a frontage of 57.75 feet, and the lot extends east and west for the entire width of Lot 8, Block
138, or a distance of 165 feet. Immediately to the south
of this area lies a house and lot belonging to appellant
of about the same frontage, and also extending east and
west the full width of Lot 8. T·o the west of both of these
areas lies another tract of ground to which appellant
claims title, whose north and south measurements equals
the combined frontage measurement of the first two
tracts mentioned, and which extends east and west the
full vvidth of Lot 7, Block 138, or a distance of 165 feet
eastward from Pugsley Street.
A driveway extends westerly from 2nd West Street
along the south side of respondents' house, and immediately adjacent to the south line of res.pondents' property
for a distance of about one-half the lot depth, where it
turns to the north and around the rear of the house,
entering a garage. The claimed easement covers not
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only this east-west portion of the driveway, but also an
of it extension to the west clear to the extreme west edge
of the respondents' property. Immediately parallel to
this driveway and to the south lies another driveway
serving the house and lot to the south, which extends
from 2nd West in a westerly direction to a warehouse,
the northeast corner of which is three or four inches
and the northwest corner of which is about nine inches
south of the dividing line between the two properties.
See appellant's exhibit BB, a certificate of survey prepared at the request of the respondents, and R. 219.
A so-called ditch slopes slightly to the west along the
full north side of this warehouse or shed, and lies wholly
upon the property of the south lot, which is not involved
in this action, in this extremely narrow strip. Immediately to the west of this warehouse, which is referred to
in the testimony as No. 1, and which was constructed
about 1917 (R. 196), lies an additional warehouse, the
north line of which is an extension of the north line of
"\varehouse No. 1 and which was in turn constructed
about 1937 (R. 210). This second warehouse lies wholly
within the property to the west of respondents' house,
which abutts on Pugsley Street and is within the limits
of Lot 7, Block 138.
By Uniform Real Estate Contract dated and recorded rOctoher 24, 1941, the Campbell Commercial Company sold the respondents thei11 house and lot, described
as follows:
Beginning 2% rods North from the Southeast corner of Lot 8, Block 138, Plat "A", Salt
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Lake City Survey, and running thence North 31f2
rods; thence \"\rest 10 rods; thence South 3¥2 rods;
thence East 10 rods to the place of beginning.
Thereafter, by '''arranty deed dated and recorded
March 23, 1944, the Campbell Commercial Campany
granted title to respondents to this property, which company had derived its title through grants running to
the original patent (See abstract, exhibit 2). On September 3, 1946, Salt Lake City executed a quitclaim
deed or disclaimer to Otto S. Grow, of such title as was
acquired by special assessment levied in connection w~th
Sewer Extension No. 437, (Exhibit G), who later quitclaimed to appellant, On October 3, 1946, the Utah Oil
Company quitclaimed a right-of-way to Appellant ''along
the south line" of respondents' property (Exhibit H).
There are a number of exhibits and some testimony
relative to the levy, assessment and sale relative to
Sewer Extension No. 437 made by Salt Lake City, but in
the interest of logic and convenience of the court the details of these matters can be more adequately vresented,
it is believed, in connection with the argument relative
to such interest as app·ellant claims Salt Lake City
acquired through the sewer assessment and sale.
There is dispute in the testimony, to a limited extent,
as to whether or not the west line of the respondents'
property was so fenced or choked with debris as to
preclude the passage of vehicles along the so called rightof-way lying on the extreme southerly portion of the
;property. Mr. William F. Weiler, property manager of
Zion's Benefit Building Society, stated that between
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

the years 1933 and 1936 he visited res;pondents' property about once a month in connection with his duties
(R. 270), and during such visit he noted the condition
of all of these premises in connection with his duties
at the time. The driveway extended from Second West
Street west to a point about 40 feet east of the west property line, and then turned north around the house. (R. 272),
and the entire west side of the property, including the
southerly :portion, was so overgrown with weeds and
choked with debris, and was ·also fenced, that it would
n9t have been possible to drive a car through this area
(R. 273). Elva Turville actually resided in these premises from 1933 to 1935 (R. 295), and stated that the
entire west end of the lot was blocked up with a ''tumbled
down old fence made of old boards and wagon wheels and
ties'' ( R. 296). She also s~ated that during this period
it was impossible to drive a car through the west portion
of the lot (R. 298). Roland Turville, her son, also .testified to the same condition (R. 306, 307). Mr. Harry C.
Grider lived in the :premises during 1939 or 1940 for a
period of about 9 months (R. 309), and testified that a
fence of sorts extended the entire length of the west
property line when he lived there (R. 310). Mr. Walter
L. Keil lived in the home immediately to the north of
the premises from 1932 to 1946 (R. 313), and from the
rear of his house had a clear view of the west end of the
respondents ' property ( R. 313). He testified that during
this period the en tire west line of the respondents' property was barricaded and obstructed by railroad ties and
berry bushes, with no opening, although a child could
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cra,vl oyer it (R. 314, 315), and that a car could not pass
(R. 316). Thiabel L. Keil, "~ife of Walter L. Keil, testified to the same condition during the early years of their
residence, (R. 327). Delsa Crystal, one of the respondents~ n1oved into the :premises "ith her husband in 1941,
at "'"hich time there 'vas an opening or gate in the south
end of the fence, along the west line large enough for a
car to go through (R. 349), which was closed by. respondents in 1942 to prevent any vehicles from going westward to the property lying to the west of this fence
(R. 349).
We should point out that there is some conflict
in the testimony after the year 1936 as to the condition of the west line, when the additional warehouse
was constructed to the west on -the property in lot 7. It
is also interesting to note that in 1916 one Cyrus Neal
owned the property of both appellant and respondents
fronting on 2nd West Street, and in granting the southerly tract now belonging to appellant, he also granted
a right of way over the south four feet of respondents'
property, apparently the intention being to create a
joint driveway between the two places. The plan did
not materialize, and this four foot easement was returned by grant in 1919. (R. 205, 206), and abstract,
exhibit 2. Again, according to the testimony of Serge
B. Campbell, president of the Campbell Commercial
Company, which was the predecessor in interest of the
present respondents, Otto Grow of the appellant company
offered to purchase a right-of-way along the south line
of the property here involved in 1939 for the sum of $400
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(R. 204), which was apparently to be used for purposes
of driving trucks from Second West Street through and
to appellants' warehouse to the rear of both appellant's
and respondents' :properties. Respondent refused such
offer because of the obvious fact that they were attempting to improve the property surrounding their house (R.
373), and did not care to have their property spoiled by
the passage of large trucks and other commercial vehicles.
Otto Grow of appellant company stated that certain
injury was done to packing boxes and supplies located
in the warehouse by virtue of the fact that a drainage
ditch along the north edge of warehouse No. 1 became
clogged and he was refused permission to go upon the
respondents' property to clean the same, with the result
that rain water accumulated and flowed into the warehouse in 1945. He testified that in 1917, the ditch was
constructed four inches wide and one foot deep at the
east end, and 'videned to ·nine inches at the west end of
warehouse No. 1. Witness Weiler, (R, 273) could not recall even the existence of any ditch in this area between
1933 and 1936; witness Campbell could only recall a
little depression in 1939 (R. 286); witness Elva Turville
between 1933 and 1935 could not recall any ditch at all
(R. 300); nor could witness Grider in 1939 and- 1940
(R. 312); nor could witness Keil (R. 322). The damage
occured, moreover, at the time of a heavy storm throughout Salt Lake city in 1945, which washed out a portion
of the city cemetery (R, 220). Mrs. Keil stated her recollection of the storm as one of water in the area like a
mill race, flooding basements, drowning chickens, and
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depositing debris of mud, silt and ""eeds over the lawns
of the property in the area (R. 327, 328), and Mr. Kiel
testified in the same Yein, placing the mud depth of deposit at four or five inches. (R. 321). Respondent Crystal testified to the same thing, and also stated that the
depression or ditch would haYe been inadequate to carry
off the flood \Yaters in any event, whether perfectly
cleaned or not (R. 357). In addition, the dividing line
between the lots abutting on 2nd West was separated
by a cement coping, eight inches high on the south side,
and twelve inches high on the north side, which extended
·eastward from the east side of warehouse No. 1. All the
property of the area slopes wetward, and the flood entered at the east end of the warehouse (R. 220). Moreover, there was a wooden fence along the south property
line and immediately north of the so-called ditch until
1937, when it was torn down (R. 218).
In 1937, Otto Grow had caused gravel to be placed
along a part of the driveway with the full consent of the
then owner of the property (R. 165). After 1942, respondent Marion Crystal removed cinders and big rocks, but
not gravel, from the southwest corner area of: the premises in connection with ·some landscaping he was doing
(R. 373), all of which material removed totalled about a
yard, or yard and one-half. Witness Campbell testified
that he cleaned up the area in 1939, and there was no
gravel of any kind in the area from which appellant
claims it was allegedly moved (R. 289).
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ARGUMENT
It is difficult to discern any correlation between the
assignments of error, argument, and what apparently
is a list of points argued in appellant's brief. In view of
this, there seems no other logical way to present argument in respondents' brief except through an analysis
of each separate cause of action. Appellant also complains as to the findings made by the court, but we cannot
determine from the brief the specific ~·oints of complaint
in this regard, and since the findings are clearly supported by the evidence, and with equal clarity support
the judgment, we can perceive no reason for analysis of
each and every finding, and the consumption of the
court's time in this regard, when in reality there may
,be no disagreement at all.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
A. There is no proof that notice of intention was
ever given of the assessment of a special tax upon the
property here involved.

As was pointed out in the statement of facts, the
sole claim of appellant to the title of the entire tract of
property owned by reS:pondents arises by virtue of a
quitclaim or disclaimer from Salt Lake City Corporation,
affecting such interest as it in turn had a.cquired by virtue of sewer extension No. 437 and proceedings thereunder.
It was stipulated between counsel during the trial
of the action that the applicable ordinances of Salt Lake
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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City should be deemed in evidence for the purpose of
trial. Generally, the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, 1920, "'"ere in effect during the years 1925 and 1926,
the period of initiation of the special tax proceedings
herein. On ~Iay 30, 1921, that portion of the Revision of
1920 dealing with special taxes was amended and revised,
and continued in effect until a later ReYision of the Salt
Lake City ordinances in 1934. Hereafter, references in
this brief to Salt Lake City ordinances will refer to the
amendment of 1921, \vhich is almost the same as the
ordinances affecting this subject found in the 1934 Revision, although there are some differences.
Section 1735 of the Salt Lake City ordinances, as
amended in 1921, provides for the notice of intention to
make the special im:p-rovement. Proper notice is jurisdictional, and unless it is given the entire assessment
and any proceedings taken thereunder are invalid, and
may be collaterally attacked: Jones VB. Foulger, 46
Utah 419, 150 pac. 933; Branting vs. Salt Lake City, 47
Utah 296, 153 Pac. 995. Property may not be taken for
a special assessment unless and until the owner of the
property is given notice and opportunity to be heard
before a competent and impartial tribunal. Elkins VB.
Millard ~Cownty Drainage District, 77 Utah 303, 294 Pac.
307.
The last paragraph of section 1735 provides as
follows:
"Within five days after the first publication
of such notice the city engineer shall furnish the
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city recorder and city treasurer a list of the
owners of the property within the district affected
by such improvement, and the recorder shall
within five days thereafter, mail post ~aid to
each of said property owners a copy of said notice
addressed to the last known residence of such
property owner. The city engineer, shall, when
directed so to do by the board of commissioners,
prepare plans and specifications for said improvements.''
There is. no evidence in this record of any compliance
with this portion of the ordinance. In an attempt, ap.parently, to prove such compliance, appellant introduced
exhibit Y, which purports to be a copy of the notice and
which is a printed document at the hottom of which appears the notation, "Notice mailed July 7, 1925. H .. T."
This is certainly no proof of any kind, and there is
nothing in the record to indicate that the property owners
affected ever received any notice at all.
Moreover, an examination of the notice, see exhibits Y and D, shows that the owners of property abutting on Second West were not in any way notified that
their property might be affected by any levy. This
notice states that there shall be a half rate applied on
both sides of Pugsley Street from 5th to 6th North
Streets, within this district, and no mention whatever
is made of Second West Street. It is apparent that there
was no possible benefit from a sewer on Pugsley ·Street
to property abutting on Second West.
Thus, in Jones vs. Foulge:r, 46 Utah 419, 150 Pac.
933; the court states at page 425:
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''Again, even in the general description, tl~e
property in the notice is limited to such n~ IS
'abutting thereon,' that is abutting on Hudson
aYenue, the street which was to be opened. By
referring to the plat it 'Yill be seen that plaintiffs' property did not actually abut, that is, adjoin the ,proposed street. We need not pause
now, however, to determine 'vhat property is
·bounding, abutting or adjacent' on or to a contemplated improvement within the purview of our
statute. It is sufficient no"\v to determine that
the description contained in the notice of intention clearly and manifestly did not include the
property of the plaintiffs as abutting property.
That was also the view of the board of equalization, and likewise of the city council when the
original ordinance was adopted. Had the city
council thought that the property of the plaintiffs was included in the notice of intention, it
would have levied the special tax thereon in the
original ordinance, and no 'amended' ordinance
would have been necessary. We thus have a
clear case ,,. .here by a general statement something may be deemed to be included which by a
particular statement is, however, clearly and manifestly excluded. This case, therefore, must be
regarded as though no notice of intention had
been published in so far as the plaintiffs are
concerned. If, therefore, the publishing of notice
of intention is jurisdictional, the city council
never obtained jurisdiction to levy the special
tax upon the property of the plaintiffs, and hence
the tax here in question is void. If the property
of the plaintiffs could be legally assessed under
the notice in question, we do not see why the
board of equalization could not have recommended that any and all property 'adjacent' to
the improvement should not also be assessed, and
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the city council could have done so by adopting
an 'amended ordinance.' To so hold would practically do away 'vith the publishing of a notice of
intention as required by our statute."
It is submitted that no notice of intention was given,
and that this constitutes a jurisdictional defect rendering the entire ;proceedings invalid.
B. Sewer assessment No. 437 was never intended to
and did not in any way affect the property here involved.

It will be recalled from the statement of fact, that
all of the property with which we are here concerned
lies within Lot 8 of Block 138. A casual glance at the
record and e:xhibits clearly shows that the assessment
for this sewer extension was levied upon Lots 2, 3, 6
and 7 of Block 138, and had no relation whatsoever to
property in Lot 8.
Exhibit A is a copy of the ordinance levying the
tax, dated September 15, 1925, and clearly shows the
extent of assessment. This ordinance is required by
section 1743 of the ordinances covering special taxes,
and provides for the levy of tax. Section 1743 provides that after certain preliminaries have been complied with:
''
the board of commissioners shall ;pass an
ordinance levying a special tax sufficient in
amount to cover the cost of such improvements,
as appears by the contract entered into for the
performance of said work .....
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''Said ordinance shall include :
'' (c) . A. description of the blocks, lots or parts
thereof~ or pieces of ground affected or bene-

fited by said improvement, and upon which said
tax is levied. ''
The ordinance of exhibit A does describe the lots
affected in detail, and reads as follows :
"AN ORDINANCE
"AN ORDINANCE LEVYING A TAX and for
the assessment of property in Sewer Districts
Nos. 1 ·and 2 (Sewer Extension No. 437) for the
purpose of constructing a sewer.
''Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners
of Salt Lake City, Utah: Section 1. That the
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City does
hereby levy the tax and provide for the assessment
of the same upon the property hereinafter described in Sewer Districts Nos. 1 and 2 (Sewer
Extension No. 437) for the purpose of constructing a sewer, to-wit:
'' ...... Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, of Blk. 138, Plat
A, Salt Lake City Survey; abutting on hoth
sides of Gale Street from 9th South to American Ave., both sides of American Avenue
from 2nd West to Gale St., both sides of
Pugsley Street from 5th to 6th North Streets

"
Again it is noted there is no inclusion of any property in Lot 8, and the above section contains all of the
property described in Block 138. The assessment has
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no more relevancy to Lot 8 than it does to property
lying along 21st South Street. While assessments of
this kind are made to the full depth of the lot affected,
this of course does not and cannot extend that assessment to any other lot. A further consideration of Exhibit A shows that the first and final estimate which is
made a part of this exhibit, and which shows in detail
the footage of abutting property, lists only Lots 2, 3, 6
and 7 of B.lock 138. Another part of this exhibit shows
the names and addresses of the property owners of the
area, giving the lot and block of their holdings. Again
this list shows only property in lots 2, 3, 6 and 7 of
Block 138. In none of these documents is the slightest
mention made of Lot 8. The exhibit also contains a
NOTICE OF SPECIAL TAX which again fails to list
any p~roperty in Lot 8, although it does cover Lots 2,
3, 6 and 7 of Block 138.
Again, the notice to property owners, Exhibit E,
w·hich initially sets forth that assessment for this sewer
extension is about to be levied, reads as follows:
''Notice
To Property Owners
Notice is hereby given that the assessment
of a tax is about to be levied by the Board of
Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, upon the
following property . . . . . Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7,
Block 138, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey,
for the pur:pose of constrncting sewer, wherein
assessment is made . . . . Pugsley St., 5th to 6th
No. ; . . . . . etc. "
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This clearly shows that all of the reference in this
notice to any property in Block 138, is to property within
Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, and nowhere is Lot 8 mentioned .
.L\.ppellan t complains of the ruling of the lower court
on the ground that the same individual owned the property here involved and the piece lying to the west of it
in Lot 7, and states that because of this, the assessment
for the sewer for the full depth back of the lots involved
included Lot 8. If the same individual happened to own
all of the property lying a mile to the east, it would be
quite as logical to state that the assessment extended that
distance. It seems completely apparent that the assessment affected only Lot 7, and could not in any way affect Lot 8 which fronted on 2nd West Street and derived
no benefit whatsoever from this sewer line. Appellant's
contention is completely without merit.
C. Any interest acquired by Salt Lake City was lost
prior to its attempted grant by redemption.

Another point deserves note in connection with this
tax sale. Exhibit F is a tax sale redemption certificate dated May 5, 1943, redeeming the affects of the
special tax sale for sewer extension No. 437 from the
certificate of sale, exhibit GG, dated August 2, 1934.
The quitclaim or disclaimer, however, from Salt Lake
City to Otto Grow. is dated September 3, 1946, Exhibit
G. It thus appears that all of the :property had been
redeemed more than 10 years prior to the execution of
this instrument from Salt Lake City, and if this is correct, no interest remained in Salt Lake City to quitSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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claim, since the effect of the redemption was to divest
the city of any such interest. It is, of course, fundamental
under Utah law that the individual redeeming acquires
no title or interest by virtue of such act.
D. There was a failure to comply with essential procedural steps relative to the acquisition by .Salt Lake City
of title to property through tax sale, rend·ering sale invalid.

While it may be that mere irregularities in some
procedural steps outlined by our statutes, and ordinances
· enacted pursuant thereto, relative to special tax sales
do not invalidate the sale, an examination of the record
shows complete omission of several essential steps in
the instant case. The extent and nature of omission
goes far beyond .anything that might be termed a mere
irregularity. The absence of the proper jurisdictional
notice of intention has already been noted, but there
are other omissions which it is submitted are of an
equally serious nature.
Section 1737 of the ordinances provides that before
any special tax for special improvement shall be levied,
the board of commissioners shall cause to be J;>ublished
a notice to contractors calling for bids which shall be
published for a period of a.t least twenty days in each
issue of a newspaper published in Salt Lake City. There
is not a scintilla of evidence in the record that any such
notice was ever given.
Section 1741 of the ordinances p-rovides that the
Board ·of Equalization after hearings on the proposed
levy, shall report to the ·city commission any changes
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or corrections made by it in the assessment list, and upon
such report being made, the board of commissioners
shall proceed "'"ith the leYy of such tax. There is nothing
in the record to show that the corrected assessment list
was so reported. ·
Section 17 50 provides :
''Notice of special tax. Immediately upon the
receipt by the city treasurer of the certified copy
of the ordinance levying a special tax or assessment, as provided herein, the city treasurer shall
give at least five day's notice in one or more
papers having a general circulation in the city,
of the time when such tax or assessment shall
become delinquent; such notice shall be substantially in the following form:

NOTICE OF SPECIAL TAX
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
"Notice is hereby given that a special tax for
the purpose of (here insert briefly a description
of the improvement for which the tax is levied)
has been levied by ordinance of the board of
commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, which
became effective on the ________________________________ .
''Said special tax is levied upon the following
described real property in Salt Lake City, to
wit: (Here insert a full description of the property affected by the levy, according to lots, blocks
or parts thereof, or pieces of ground as the sa.me
may have been platted and recorded), and is due
and payable in equal annual installments, beginning __________ -----------------------------_.
"Interest at the rate of . . . (not to exceed
seven) per cent :per annum on the whole amount
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of said tax shall be computed from the date the
ordinance levying said tax becomes effective, to
wit: the ________________ day of ________________________________ 19________ ;
and interest at said rate on the whole amount
of said tax unpaid shall be due and payable with
each installment. ________________ If any installment or the
interest aforesaid. is not paid on the date when
the same becomes due, then the whole amount of
the tax unpaid at the time said installment and
interest are due will become due and payable, and
will draw interest at the rate of ten per cent per
annum until paid. One or more of said installments in the order in which they are payable
aforesaid, or the whole tax, may be paid at any
time within fifteen days after the ordinance levying the tax become effective, without interest;
·and one or more of said installments in the order
in which they are payable, or the whole tax unpaid, may be paid on the day any installment is
due, by paying the amount thereof and interest
to said day. If said tax is not paid when due
I shall proceed at once to collect same with interest and costs, as provided by law and ordinance.

"
Exhibit W is apparently the only proof of compliance with this section. It will be noted that there is
nothing in the exhibit to show that the very purpose of
the section, namely to enable property owners to determine when the tax becomes delinquent, had been properly
presented to interested parties. In net effect, there is
no proof that this notice was ever given. Moreover,
the section requires a description of the property by
lots and blocks, but this apparently was not done. It
is true that Exhibit A contains a notice which follows
I.
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the requirements of the section· above, b~tt there is nothing to show it was. published a.s it appears in Exhibit A.
As has been previously noted, moreover, this delinquent
notice in Exhibit A is a notice that taxes are delinquent,
not on Lot 8, but on lots 2, 3, 6 and 7 of Block 138.
Section 1751 of the ordinances requires the city
treasurer to deposit in the mails postpaid and addressed
to the several owners of the property affected by the
levy, as they appear on the records of the county assessor, a personal notice, containing the facts relating
to the assessment and substantially in the form provided
for the published notice above. Exhibit V is apparently
the proof of this mailing, but consists of an affidavit
attached to a blank printed form, and does not in any
way indicate that a single notice was mailed to any particular property holder affected by this levy.
Section 1752 of the ordinances p·rovides :
"Within ten days after the date of delinquency, as fixed in the levy and notice of tax,
the city treasurer shall proceed to make up a
list of all property upon which the special tax
remains due and unpaid, and upon completion
cause the same to be published in some newspaper having general circulation in the city,_ daily
thereafter for a period of ten day~.''

"
As this court stated in Peterson vs. Ogden City,
176 P. 2d 599, 603, 604:
''Plaintiff makes two arguments for laches
or estoppel. The first is that that part of Section
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20 of the ordinance which says, 'Ten days after
the date of delinquency as fixed in the levy and
notice of tax, or thereafter, the City Treasurer
shall proceed to make up a list of all property
upon which special taxes remain due and unpaid,
and upon completion cause the same to be published once in some newspaper having general
circulation in Ogden City,' is mandatory and the
failure of the treasurer to act within the time
provided defeats the lien. Technically, this is not
an argument for 'laches' or 'estoppel' as those
words are ordinarily used but rather an argument that the city has failed to comply with a
mandatory statutory provision and has therefore
lost its lien.
''We agree that the treasurer must comply
with Section 20 in order to make a valid sale of
the property for special taxes.

"
Exhibit B is an affidavit of publication of this delinquency notice. It was not published for a period of
ten days at all, but as appears from the affidavit only
in one issue of the Deseret News, on July 30, 1934, nor
can it be determined from the record that even this
one publication was within 10 days after date of delinquency.
It will be observed that time and again In the
course of procedural steps there has been a failure to
give the property owners affected by the levy a notice
of the status of the levy as required by the ordinances.
Appellant's brief takes the position that all of these
omissions are mere irregularities which can· have no
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ultimate effect on the tax sale. If this were true, then
the only step required under such reasoning would be
that of acquiring- a valid notice of intention. We do not
believe this is the la,v, and believe that these additional
steps and notices are as essential to continuing jurisdiction as the original notice of intention.
Ap:p·ellant cites the case of Stott vs. Salt Lake ·City,
47 Utah 113, 151 Pac. 988 for the proposition that in a
case of this kind irregularities in the absence of fraud,
mistake or gross injustice, are not available to one contesting a tax deed. In the Stott case, the essential controversy arose over whether or not the sidewalk had
been constructed in conformity with the type specified
in the notice of intention, and the evidence showed that
although there had been some structural change, the
sidewalk as constructed was equally a.s serviceable as
that of the notice. The suit, moreover, was not one
determining the validity of a tax sale, but was an attempt on the part of proJ>erty owners to restrain and
enjoin the collection of the special levy. Irregularities
of the type involved in that case are entirely distinct
from the failure, as in the instant case, to conform to
the various steps required to effect a valid tax sale.
Appellant further cites Branting V'S. Salt Lake City,
47 Utah 296, 153 P_ac. 995, for the same proposition.
That case was an attempt to annual certain ordinances
and proceedings in connection with a special tax. The
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language of the case itself clearly indicates the issues,
at 1page 298 :
"While it is not disputed in the complaint
that the a:ppellan t had complied with all the jurisdictional steps required by our statute to authorize it to order the sewer constructed and to make
the assessment and to levy the special tax to pay
therefor, yet it is alleged that the appellant exceeded its jurisdiction or authority in making
an assessment and in levying a tax in excess
of a certain amount as hereinafter stated."
Again the type of irre~ularity was something -entirely distinct from the complete omission ·of necessary
procedural steps, which is the question here involved,
and it submitted that the case is for that reason entirely
irrelevant.
Appellant also seems to take the position in its brief,
page 9, that the burden is upon the respondents to prove
wherein the tax proceedings are invalid. We believe
the record clearly shows this failure, but submit that
under well established Utah law a person who seeks
to set up a tax title in himself must 1prove that all procedural steps to perfect that title have been fully complied with.
Thus in the early case of Eastman vs. Gurry, 15
Utah 411, 49 Pac. 310, the court stated at page 417:
''Many of these questions arose and were
decided in the case of Olsen v. Bagley, 10 Utah
492. In that case the court held that 'tax sales
are made exclusively under statutory power, and,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
unless all the necessary prerequisites of the statute are carried out, the tax sale become invalid.
If one of the prerequisites fail, it is as fatal as
if all failed. The power vested in a public officer
to sell land for the nonpayment of taxes is a
naked power, not coupled with an interest, and
every prerequisite to the exercise of the :power
must precede its exercise. ·The title to be acquired under statutes authorizing the sale of
land for the nonpayment of taxes is regarded
as stricti juris, and whoever sets up a tax title
must show that all the requirements of the law
have been complied with.' ''
See Tinctic Undine Mining Co. vs. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah
561, 74 p. 2d 1184.
Appellant also complains, brief, page 11, that the
court erred in not requiring respondents to reimburse
appellant for the amount of taxes allegedly paid by it.
The reason the court did not do so is apparent, and as
was pointed out above, this assessment was never levied
upon nor intended to cover Lot 8, which derived no
benefit from said sewer. There was obviously no occasion to reimburse appellant for taxes which never existed
so far as this property is concerned.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
A. There is a failure of proof to establish an easement of any kind in behalf of appellant over tbe property
of respondents.

The pleadings in regard to the second cause of
action fail to specify in :any way the basis under which
appellant claims an easement over respondents' propSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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erty. While it is believed this is necessary, apparently
on the trial of the action this cause of action was based·
upon a quitclaim deed dated October 3, 1946 from the
Utah Oil Refining Company, Exhibit H. An examination ·of the deed shows that it does not purport to grant
a right-of-way over the south ten feet of the property,
but vaguely ''along the south line''. In any event, the
record and this exhibit clearly indicates that no interest
passed by this deed because the Utah Oil Refining Company never possessed or intended to own such a right
of way.
Exhibit 1, introduced by respondent, is an agreement between the then owner of the property and the
Oil Company dated September 17, 1923. The exhibit
obviously concerned the use of underground waters.
Mr. Robert G. Clark, Chief Engineer, Utah Oil Refining
Company, testified that during the early 1920's the
company was pumping water from its wells near the refinery, with the resultant lowering of the water table
in adjacent areas. The property here involved was
within those areas, and the then owner commenced a
suit against the company seeking damages for this drain
upon the underground waters. The recitals of the instrument itself and the testimony of Mr. Clark (R. 257
to 259), make this clear. In settlement of that lawsuit,
and to grant to the Oil Company certain undergrbund
water rights, exhibit 1 was executed. The language of
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the granting clause and one additional paragraph (the
instrument is not herein set out in full) is as follows:
'' . A. nd said g~rantors have granted, sold, conveyed and quitclaimed, and by these presents do
grant, sell, convey and quitclaim to the Utah Oil
Refining Company, a corporation, grantee, all
of the right, title and interest of said grantors
and of each of them in and to all of the artesian,
percolating and natural subsurface waters, appurtenant to, belonging to, or underlying and
contained in the so called Artesian Basin, and
other artesian basins, as same underlies Blocks
115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138,
139 and 151, Plat A, Salt Lake City Survey, being
a survey of part of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and particularly all of
the right, title and interest of said grantors in
and to said artesian, percolating and natural
sub-surface waters appurtenant to, belong to,
underlying and contained in the following described property in said city, county,_ and state,
to-wit:

"Commencing 14 rods South from the northeast corner of Lot 8: Block 138; Plat A, Salt
Lake City Survey, and running thence West 19
Rods, thence South 6 rods, thence East 9 rods,
thence North 3lf2 rods, thence east 10 rods, thence
north 2% rods to the place of beginning, together
with a right of way along the South line of the
East 10 rods thereof, Eastward to Second West
Street.
''For said foregoing considerations grantees
may drain said described lands of sub-surface
and percolating water so far as can he done from
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underground, but without going on said premises
to dig or make drains or otherwise interfere
therewith.''
The clear intent and legal effect of this document is
apparent. It simply grants to the Utah Oil Refining
Comp:any underground water rights which lie beneath
certain :property particularly described by met~s and
bounds, which description at its conclusion mentions a
right of way along the south line of the property. This
right-of-way along the south line is simply part of the
area described from which the water rights, lying underneath the property, are to be taken, and there is nothing
in this grant to show that it conveyed any interest in
realty as such, merely water rights. It is not a grant
of a right-of-way, but of water rights lying underneath
the described property. The mention of right-of-way
is an integral part of the paragraph describing the
property. Not only this, but the later varagraph specifically denies the grantee the right to go upon said
premises or "interfere therewith". This is scarcely consistent with a right-.iof-way to go upon the premises.
Even if this language could be construed as a grant,
and is it submitted that it cannot be, the only conceivable purpose of such a grant would be to go upon the
land for uses in connection with the use of underground
waters, not a general easement as appellant seeks to
establish. American Jurisprudence makes this clear.
Thus at 17 Am. Jur. 99·6, sec. 98:
''The use of an easement must be confined
strictly to the purposes for which it vvas granted
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or reserved. 1-\. principle which underlies the use
of all easements is that the owner of an easement cannot materially increase the burden of
it upon the servient estate or impose thereon a
ne'v and additional burden .... "
Moreover, there is abandonment of any easement
that might conceivably have existed. Ruling

~Case

Law
states the well established rule, at 9 R. C. L. 812, sec.
68 as follows :

''An easement may be abandoned by unequivocal acts showing a clear intention to abandon
and terminate the right, or it may be done by
acts in pais without deed or other writing. The
intention to abandon is the material question,
and it may be proved by an infinite variety of
acts. It is a question of fact to be ascertained
from all the circumstances of the case; and, as
a rule, no one case can be authority for another.
Time is not a necessary element; it is not the
duration of the nonuser, but the nature of the
acts done by the dominant owner, or of the adverse acts acquiesced in by him, and the intention which the one or the other indicates, that
are important, and a. cessation of use for a term
less than the :prescriptive period, accompanied
by acts clearly indicating an intent to abandon
the right, will work an extinguishment of the
easement ..... "
Mr. Clark of the Oil Refining Company testified
that there was never any user made by that company
from the time of the grant to time of executing the instrument of conveyance to the appellant in O·ctober,
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1946, and 'to time of trial. His testimony clearly showed
that the Oil C·ompany had neither need nor use for any
right-of-way and never at any time asserted itself the
possessor of such a right. The testimony of the other
witnesses showed that the right of way was blocked
at the west end during the 1930's by a specie of fence
and rubbish, and in 1942 the present respondents replaced the block of the right-of-way, which continued
to the time of trial.
There is an additional factor. It is evidenced by the
record (Exhibit S) that respondents and predecessors
in interest have paid taxes on the property in question,
have protected it by a substantial enclosure, have cultivated and improved it, have expended labor and money
upon it, and have adversely held it against all other
persons, including the Utah Oil Company, for the statutory time of adverse possession. See Section 104-2-7
U.C.A. 1943.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
The allegations of the third cause of action are
identical with those of the second cause of action, except
that the right-of-way is described as being 10 feet wide,
more or less, rather than 10 feet wide. The argument
herein, relative to the second cause of action, is therefore
adopted for the third cause of action.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
A. There is a failure of proof to ~establish an ~ease
ment of any kind in behalf of appellant over the property
of respondents by prescription.
Apparently the theory of the fourth cause of action
is that the appellants have acquired a right-of-way over
respondents' property by virtue of prescription and
adverse user over a :period of more than twenty years.
The recent case of · Bertolina vs. Fr.ates, 89 Utah
238, 57 P. 2d 346, clearly sets forth the rules of law
applicable to acquisition of an easement by prescription.
Thus at page 348, the court states:
''Where a person claims to have acquired an
easement by prescription over another's land,
he must show that he has acquired it by his own
continuous, open, uninterrupted, and adverse
user under claim of right for the twenty-year
prescriptive period. The prescriptive right is
based originally upon the theory of a grant implied from long user. Funk v. Anderson, 22 Utah,
238, 61 P. 1006. It runs to the individual and not
to the public. Mr. Washburn, in his, work on
Easements (4th Ed.), sec 43, p. 164, says : 'But
one can not claim a right of way as a :private one
by showing that it had been used by the proprietors of other lots than his own, He must
show a user by himself or his predecessors of
the way to his own lot under a claim of right
for the requisite period of time, continuously, by
the acquiescence of the owner of the land over
which it lies.'
''Everywhere in the books the statement upon
the creation of a prescriptive right is: That it
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must be adverse, not by license or favor, under
claim or assertion of right, hostile to the right of
the owner so as to expose the claimant to an action
of trespass if his claim is not well founded. A
user by an individual which is not distinguished
from that of the public will be considered permissive and not adverse unless there is evidence
that it was under a claim of right in himself and
that the owner knowing of such claim acquiesced
in it. Authorities should be unnecessary to demonstrate that principle. The mere statement of
the conditions under which the prescriptive right
may be acquired negatives the idea of user by
others either adding to or detracting from the
rights of a particular claimant.''
The court continues at page 349, relative to unity of
ownership:
"Unity of possession and ownership prevents
the acquisition of a prescriptive right. As the
book say : A man cannot prescribe against himself."
And at page 350 :
"It thus appears from the evidence that there
was a unity of title and possession of the tracts
owned by plaintiffs and these defendants down
to the year 1896 and again from 1910 .to 1919.
There is no period in the history of the title to
these tracts when the prescriptive right could
have been acquired. Unity of possession and
ownership, as heretofore indicated, defeats the
running of the prescriptive period.
'' 'An owner of land can not have an easement in his own estate in fee, for the plain and
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obvious reason that in having the jus disponendi
- the full and unlimited right and power to
make any and every possible use of the land all subordinate and inferior derivative rights
are neeessarily merged and lost in the higher
right * * *: Accordingly "\Yhen the owner of an
estate enjoys an easement over another estate
and acquires title to the latter the easement is
thereby extinguished.' 19 C. J. 945, sec. 156. ''
In the case before the court, the record clearly discloses that the west portion of the land which appellant
contends is the dominant tenement and which lies in
Lot 7, and the east portion of the land over which the
easement is claimed, which lies in Lot 8 and now belongs
to Respondents, were joined as one piece as late as 1929.
Exhibit S, ·w. hich is an abstract covering both the properties in Lot 7 and Lot 8, clearly shows that until 1929,
Cyrus Neal owned all of this property. He acquired the
southerly portion of the entire tract on March 2, 1910,
see entry 16 of said exhibit, and the northerly portion
on April 21, 1916, see entry 23. He owned all of this
property until July 8, 1929, when he conveyed the westerly 1lortion lying in Lot 7 to one Byron D. Nebeker, see
entry 32. No prescriptive period could possibly commence to run, therefore, until the year 1929, and there
could obviously not be twenty years adverse· user by the
year 1946. On this ground alone there is complete
failure of proof.
There is an even more complete failure of proof to
show continuous and adverse user by appellant or its
predecessors in interest. The statement of facts has set
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forth in detail the testimony of a great number of
witnesses to the effect that during the period of the
1930's the west end of the alleged right-of-way was so
choked with debris, wagon wheels and remnants of an
old fence that it was impossible to drive any sort of
vehicle through the area. While there was some testimony that vehicles of appellant had driven through the
area in 1937 and a few later years, the driving was sporadic a.nd seasonal. In this connection, it is pointed out
that the conflict which appears for a few of these years
in the testimony was resolved by the action of the trial
judge in his findings and judgment in favor of respondents. He had an opportunity to observe the witnesses
on the stand, their demeanor and apparent credibility,
and there is certainly a tremendous amount of testimony clearly showing the blockage during this period.
Actually, there is no proper testimony at all in the record
showing any continuous adverse user as a right-of-way
for vehicles for twenty years, and the attempt to prove
this produced, particularly before 1936, proof of the
passage of children getting groceries or of Otto Grow
occasionally walking a part of the way along the south
part of the lot to go to work. Moreover, it is clear from
the record that whatever sporadic and uncertain passage
there might have been was with the full consent of the
predecessors in interest of res:pondents' property, until
respondents closed the right-of-way by boarding it up
in 1942. See R. 163. This is of particular interest in
such conflict as developed after the year 1937. See, for
example, R. 158. It is submitted that there is a complete
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lack of testimony to establish a prescriptive easement
under the applicable rules of law, particularly as set
forth in Bertinola rs. Frates, supra. See Lund vs. Wilcox,
34 Utah 205, 97 Pac. 33; Farr vs. Wheelw,rig'ht 'Construction Co., 49 Utah 274, 163 Pac. 256.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
A. There is no evidence to support a restraining
order against respondents or to form the basis for damages
to personal property.

The fifth cause of action seeks an order restaining
the respondents from placing debris or material in the
ditch or depression which lies along the north side of
appellant's warehouse No. 1 which is located on property
to the south of that belonging to respondents, or from
interfering with appellant's access thereto for purposes
of cleaning the same. Punitive and actual damages are
also sought by reason of alleged flooding of the warehouse because the ditch was allowed to become clogged
with debris.
At the outset, it is clear that this so-called ditch lay
wholly upon the land of the appellant, next adjacent to
respondents' south property line. Thus at page 219 of
the record, Otto Grow testified as to the location of the
ditch, and it is not contradicted:

"Q. And you say this ditch was contained en ..
tirely within your own property~
A. Yes, that is the way we figured when we
surveyed to remodel this building on the north
side. Your survey shows that was on our property.
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Q. This .property, then, would be on that

stretch three inches wide on the east and about
eight or nine inches on the west~
A. Yes.
Q. That is where the ditch

runs~

A. Yes.''
The right to clean the ditch is clear, provided appellant did not trespass upon the property of the respondents to do so. If it had such a right to come upon this
prorperty to clean the ditch, it could only arise in the
nature of an easement, through twenty years prescriptive
usage. The evidence in the record in this regard seems to
be in the testimony of Edward J. Burke, R. 99, 100, that
two to four years prior to the time of trial Delsa Crystal
told him to leave the premises of respondents when he
was cleaning out the ditch, and again in the testimony of
Otto Grow, R. 172, that he had overheard Delsa Crystal
tell Burke to get off the property, about a year 1prior to
the trial. Whether these incidents are one and the same
is not entirely clear. There is clearly a lack of evidence
to show twenty years user within the meaning of the rules
of law applicable to prescription.
So far as the claim that res:pondents had placed,
themselves, debris in the ditch is concerned, there is not
a scintilla of evidence in the record to support any such
claim, and appellant has pointed to none. Appellant in
its argument at page 13 of its brief on the fifth cause
of action also states that respondents admit removing
gravel supporting the side of the ditch, and directs the
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court's attention to ~page 61 of the record. R. 61 contains
at the top of the ~page the findings of the trial court in
respect to the sixth cause of action, which reads as
follows: ''and that defendants removed during the year
1942 from the westerly one-third of said right-of-way
cinders and loose sand''.
There is no proof that any ·damage to merchandise in the warehouse by flooding was caused
by any act of the respondents. The statement of
facts shows clearly that there was serious doubt as to
whether or not the ditch was anything much more than
a shallow depression, that the damage was done during
the course of a violent r-ain storm which piled a great
depth of water in the area and deposited four to five
inches of silt on the lawns, and that whether the ditch
or depression was clear or obstructed would have had
no bearing on its ability to handle the volume of water
of the storm or flood at the time the damage was done,

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
A. There is no proof of any damage to appellant by
virtue of removal of gravel from alleged right-of-way.

In the sixth cause of action appellant seeks both
punitive and actual damages for the removal of gravel
from the westerly :portion of the alleged right-of-way
area. For reasons which have heretofore been argued at
length, it is submitted that appellant had no right, title
or interest in or to any part of respondents' land, by
easement or otherwise. The fa.ct that the respondent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

Marion Crystal removed a yard or yard and one-half
of rna terial, which he testified was cinders and loose
sand from this area to another part of the yard for leveling and landscaping work clearly gives no cause of action
for damages. It is also noted that any such cause of
action could in .any event only have arisen in favor of
Otto Grow, the individual who claimed he caused the
gravel to be placed on the area in 1937. He is not a party
to the action.

In conclusion, it is submitted that the judgment of
the lower court should be fully sustained, since entirely
consistent with the evidence and the rules of applicable
law, and that respondents should he awarded costs on
this a prpeal.
Respectfully submitted,
Skeen, Thurman and Worsley,
and Edward G. Linsley,
Attorneys for R.espondents
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